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TAX REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA: A COMPARISON
CHARLES 0. GALVIN*
The current national debate on federal budget cuts and income tax reduction
raises anew the question of whether the United States can undertake a thorough
assessment and overhaul of its taxing system.I Our sister democracy, Canada, did
undertake a major tax reform effort some years ago2 and an analysis of the results
of that effort may be helpful in predicting the success of such an undertaking in
this country.3 Moreover, the parallel developments in tax reform in the two coun-
tries during the last twenty years provide a striking comparison of efforts at serious
tax reform in two representative democracies which, although different in size and
population, have similar fiscal and economic problems.
I
TAX REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES--A BRIEF HISTORY
Any discussion of the chances of successful tax reform in the present time must
necessarily take into account the experiences of the past. The history of tax reform
may be divided into four periods: 1913-1939, 1939-1964, 1964-1981, and the Eco-
nomic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.
A. 1913-1939
It was the practice of the Congress during this period to reenact the tax laws by
a series of separate revenue acts. In particular, the Revenue Act of 19284 has been
noted as a model of simplicity in content and structure; its interstices were filled by
regulations, rulings, and the decided cases where necessary. Simplicity in this pe-
riod, however, was not necessarily attributable to the genius of the lawmakers.
Rather, the evolution from simplicity to complexity in the law almost directly cor-
relates with the evolution to a broader tax base and higher tax rates, and during
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most of this period exemptions were generous and the rates were low. Therefore,
the class of filers was small and within that group the bite was gentle. For exam-
ple, in 1925 a married couple with two children and a taxable income of $15,000
paid about $280 in tax, and there were no social security deductions or income tax
withholding.5 Corporate income was taxed at a rate of about 12 percent. 6
The government's need for revenues was minimal; the requirements of the
federal fisc in the mid-twenties were incredibly modest. The entire federal budget
in 1925 was about $3 billion,7 as contrasted with projections for the current budget
year of amounts in excess of $700 billion.8  Indeed the government was operating
at such a surplus during this period that the Secretary of the Treasury, Andrew W.
Mellon, persuaded the Congress to reduce taxes for the year 1925 and to refund
certain portions of taxes collected for 1924. 9 Thus, there was no general popular
interest to generate research and critical writing about the tax system. To be sure,
some economists wrote theoretical treatises, but the few articles in the law, ac-
counting, and business journals were primarily concerned with practical applica-
tion of the system.
B. 1939-1964
The next period began when the Internal Revenue Code of 193910 was en-
acted. The hearings preceding its enactment involved little probing analysis of the
effects of the revenue laws on the economy and of the equity and fairness of the
system as it applied to the taxpaying community."I Nor was any long range tax
policy objective developed. The new Code, therefore, merely reflected the extant
law in a more orderly statutory arrangement than had previously existed.
The inauguration of President Roosevelt in 1933 and the New Deal Adminis-
tration's introduction of Keynesian 12 economics had moved the federal govern-
ment into an activist role in stimulating the economy through increased taxes and
government expenditures. Moreover, World War II and the Korean conflict oc-
curred during this period, creating a need for greatly increased revenues. Exemp-
tions were lowered and sharply progressive rates of 20 percent to 90 percent came
into force. 13 Correspondingly, the number of filers increased significantly and the
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tax bite became more serious for all. The terms "tax shelter" and "estate plan-
ning" entered the vocabulary, and special interest groups began to press the Con-
gress to legislate a variety of special provisions. 14 In time, the 1939 Code became
riddled with amendments. This led to a second major recodification: the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954,15 which is the base of the present tax law.
A critical examination of tax policy began in the early 1950s. With regard to
the public sector, a subcommittee of the Joint Committee on the Economic Report
of the Congress in 1955 summoned academicians and practitioners throughout the
country to submit discussion papers on tax policy;16 and in 1959 and 1960 the
House Ways and Means Committee conducted panel discussions based on a series
of technical presentations from numerous witnesses which led to the publication of
a three-volume Tax Revision Compendium. 17 A cursory reading of those volumes
even today reflects an impressive vitality and perception about tax reform for the
United States.
In the private sector during this period, various professional organizations
moved forward with projects, conferences, institutes and studies to examine partic-
ular aspects of the tax laws.18 As an example, the Section of Taxation of the
American Bar Association in 1962 selected a Special Committee on Substantive
Tax Reform to study the feasibility of a simplified, broad-based, low rate income
tax system to foster economic growth and capital formation and to facilitate com-
pliance and administration. t 9 This study was the first undertaken by a private
association of lawyers to provide a major critical overview of the tax system. The
committee's reports in 196320 and 196421 became significant American Bar Associ-
ation publications which compelled the professional and business communities to
confront the difficult issues involved in making broad scale tax reform a reality.
22
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At the close of this period the Revenue Act of 196423 was enacted; it amended the
1954 Code and reduced the previously existing progressive rate schedules ranging
from 20 percent to 90 percent to a range of 14 percent to 70 percent. 24
C. 1964-1981
This period has been one of frenetic activity in the federal taxation field in
both the public and private sectors. In the public sector, a series of revenue acts, 2 5
has over-articulated the applicable rules, proliferated complications, and thereby
led to further legislative action. This hemorrhaging of legislation, particularly
from 1969 onward, has been accompanied by extensive Treasury studies and hear-
ings before the tax-writing committees of the Congress. 26
An intensification of activities in the private sector has paralleled the work in
the public sector, with participation by such organizations as the Brookings Insti-
tution, the National Tax Association, the American Law Institute, the American
Bar Association, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants and many
others. The project which the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Associa-
tion began in 1962 was continued jointly by the American Bar Foundation and
Southern Methodist University. This joint pilot study demonstrated that legal
analysis could be combined with economic analysis, aided by computer technol-
ogy, to develop a variety of econometric models to test various assumptions relat-
ing to a broad-based, low rate tax system. This pilot study was published in
1969,27 and led to a more comprehensive project published by the Fund for Public
Policy Research of Washington in 1973.28 Both the pilot study and the larger
project demonstrated that corporate income taxes could be eliminated from the
system and that a single comprehensive individual income tax with a flat rate of 11
percent to 13 percent or a graduated rate of 4 percent to 54 percent could yield the
same revenues as the existing law.29 Some staff members of this project were then
employed to develop an important Treasury document entitled Blueprz'ntsfor Basic
Tax Reform, released in January 1977.30
Blueprints deserves extended comment because it resembles in a primitive way
the larger tax reform effort which Canada had undertaken fifteen years earlier:
23. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).
24. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 1, 68A Stat. 3.
25. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969); Tax Reduction Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976);
Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 (1977); Revenue Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
26. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, & SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91TH CONG., IST
SESS, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS U.S. TREASURY DEPT., PARTS 1-4, JOINT PUBLICATION
(Comm. Print 1969).
27. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION & SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY, STUDIES IN SUBSTANTIVE
TAX REFORM (A. Willis ed. 1969).
28. COMMISSION To REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX STRUCTURE
(1973).
29. Id. at 192.
30. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977) [hereinafter cited as
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the Report of he Royal Commission on Taxation ("Carter Commission").3 1 Published
by the outgoing Ford administration, Blueprints is a credit to the tenacity of Presi-
dent Ford's Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, Assistant Treasury Secre-
tary Charles Walker, and Deputy Assistant Secretaries David Bradford and
William Goldstein, because it was the first time that the highest executive level
focused on overall tax reform. The Blueprints document posed two plans for revi-
sion. First, it proposed a comprehensive income tax base which would treat all
realized accretions to net worth as income. 32 All realized income, less expenses
incurred to produce it, would constitute the taxable base, and all income would be
taxed in accordance with the same rate schedule. The corporate income tax would
be wholly integrated with the individual income tax so that corporate income pass-
ing through the corporate entity and into the hands of shareholders as dividends
would be taxed only once.33 The tax rates under this comprehensive system would
range from 8 percent to 38 percent and would be expected to produce the same
revenue as under existing law.34
The second plan proposed a consumption, 35 or cash flow, tax which would use
the same comprehensive base as the first plan, but would allow a deduction for all
investments or savings. 36 Under this proposal only the income which taxpayers
actually consumed in goods and services would become part of the tax base.37 The
tax rates under this plan would range from 10 percent to 40 percent. 38
The Blueprints proposal was a constructive beginning for tax reform, but, unfor-
tunately, the incoming Carter Administration did not pursue the proposals. Al-
though President Carter in the 1976 presidential campaign described the federal
tax system as a national disgrace, 39 he recommended no comprehensive plan for
revision. The Revenue Act of 197840 and the Windfall Profit Tax Act of 19804'
reflected a continuation down the path of tinkering and patchwork efforts.
D. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
On August 13, 1981, President Reagan signed into law a budget which reduced
expenditures generally across the board, except for proposed increases in military
expenditures. At the same time he signed the Economic Recovery Tax Act of
31. Supra note 2.
32. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 30, at 3.
33. Id at 4.
34. Id at 159.
35. Id at 9.
36. Id at 113.
37. The concept of a tax on consumption, or expenditures, is not new. An argument for such a tax is
that receipts of funds or accretions to wealth are not income until they are enjoyed or consumed, at which
point the tax should apply. A basic reference is N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); see also,
Andrews, A Comsumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974); Graetz,
Implementig a Progressioe Consumption Tax, 92 HARV. L. REv. 1575 (1979); Warren, Would a Consumption Tax
be Fairer than an Income Tax, 89 YALE L. J. 1081 (1980); Bradford & Toder, Consumption vs. Income Base Taxes:
The Argument on Grounds of Equity and Simplicity, 69 NAT'L TAX A. PRoc. 25 (1976).
38. BLUEPRINTS, supra note 30, at 169.
39. 32 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 851, 852 (1976).
40. Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
41. Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980).
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198 1,42 which is complex and far reaching in its application. Its principal features
include a 25 percent reduction in tax rates on individual incomes with such reduc-
tions spread over three years,4 3 a reduction in the tax on corporate incomes in the
lowest two brackets, 44 a new accelerated cost recovery system which will permit
new investments in tangible real and personal property to be recovered over
shorter life periods. 45 Other provisions include more generous deductions for char-
itable contributions for individuals and corporations, 46 and liberalized exemptions
and credits which will be phased in for the estate and gift tax system to reduce its
impact to less than 1 percent of the estates of decedents. 47 Especially important
was a new provision for indexing income tax rates and exemptions beginning in
1985; the adjustment will be governed by the Consumer Price Index.
The administration has discarded the Keynesian principle of demand side eco-
nomics and has opted for a new direction based on supply side economics. 48 This
new policy is expected to reduce the role of government in investment and en-
trepreneurial decision-making and also to reduce the role of government in com-
peting for capital in the money market. By encouraging capital formation
through investment incentives, reduced taxes, and liberalized capital cost recov-
eries the ultimate result is projected to be a healthy, growing economy with em-
phasis on the function of the free market system. Although the new legislation
neither proposes the elimination of the tax on corporate income nor provides an
integration of corporate and personal income taxes, the expected effect of the new
rules, and, in particular, the new accelerated cost recovery system, would be to
reduce the tax on capital intensive industries to a minimum.
It is regrettable that in all the intensive activity leading up to this legislation,
neither party's leadership proposed any major reassessment of the general concepts
of an income tax system.
E. Summary
A review of the principles enunciated in the past reveals a common theme: the
nation's economic well-being will be best served by a broad-based, low rate income
tax system that is fair and equitable, understandable by the general taxpaying
public, easily administered, and conducive to growth and stability. Of course, dif-
ferent advocates have varied emphases and definitions of these basic desiderata,
but the consensus is that the nation's professional, business, and investment skills
should be employed to make choices that increase productivity and satisfy human
desires rather than those that serve only tax gimmickry, emphasize the tax "an-
gle," or seek the tax shelter. Yet this broad consensus has never reached fruition in
legislative enactment. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, 4 9 the Tax Reduction Act of
42. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ERTA].
43. Id § 101 (amending I.R.C. § 1).
44. Id § 231 (amending I.R.C. § II).
45. Id § 201 (adding I.R.C. § 168).
46. Id § 121 (amending I.R.C. § 170).
47. d §§ 401-02 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010).
48. See Musgrave, supra note 1.
49. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
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1975, 50 the Tax Reform Act of 1976,5 1 the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act
of 1977,52 the Revenue Act of 1978, 53 and the new Economic Recovery Tax Act of
198154 are largely cut-and-paste efforts layered upon already incomprehensible




Canada first imposed an income tax in 1917,55 which continued in force with
amendments until 1948 when the rules were recodified. 56 The next major revision
was a reordering and renumbering in 1952. 5 7 Tax rates were generally low in the
1920s and early 1930, but by 1966 ranged from 12.8 percent to 80 percent. 58 Dis-
satisfaction with the Canadian system developed in a manner similar to that which
prevailed in the United States.
A. 1962-1967
In a bold and daring venture into tax reform, Canada began a serious critical
analysis of its tax policy. A nonpartisan independent Royal Commission on Taxa-
tion (called the Carter Commission after its Chairman, Mr. Kenneth LeM. Carter)
was organized in 1962.59 The Carter Commission operated independently of polit-
ical or special interest pressure, and was well-funded and well-staffed to accom-
plish its assignment.Y° The report of the Commission was published in 1966. It
was a multivolume document with supporting appendices and working papers
which essentially adopted the classic Haig-Simons definition of income.
The Haig-Simons definition may be simply stated: income equals accretions to
wealth plus consumption plus transfers by gift.61 To illustrate: assume that an
50. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975).
51. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
52. Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 (1977).
53. Pub. L. No. 95-600 92 Stat. 2763 (1978).
54. Supra note 42.
55. Income War Tax Act of 1917, c. 28 Can. Stat. 171.
56. Income Tax Act, c. 52 Can. Stat. 475 (1948).
57. CAN. REV. STAT. C. 148 (1952).
58. 3 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 169.
59. The Order in Council appointing the Commissioners and setting forth the charge has a familar
ring. The Commission was to consider:
(a) the distribution of burdens among taxpayers...
(b) the effects of the tax system on employment, living standards, savings and investment, industrial
productivity, and economic stability and growth;
(c) . . .anomalies or inequities . . . loopholes which permit the use of devices to avoid fair taxation;
(d) the effects . . . on . . . international payments...;
(e) . . .[how to] encourage Canadian ownership of Canadian industry...
(f) . . .[how to] achieve clarity, simplicity, and effectiveness...;
(g) [and] such other related matters as the Commissioners consider[ed] pertinent or relevant. ...
The Commission was given broad inquiry powers to carry out its mission. P.C. 1962-1334, 1 ROYAL
COMM'N REPORT,, supra note 2, at v.
60. The Privy Council authorization included full powers of subpoena under the Inquiries Act and
power to employ all necessary staff subject to the approval of the Treasury Board. Id.
61. H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 61-62 (1938); Haig, The Concept oflncome-Economzi and
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individual at birth has no vested property rights or interests, so that his initial
power of consumption is zero. Throughout his lifetime he receives net accretions
to wealth, or power of consumption, such as wages, rents, interest, royalties, divi-
dends, gifts, bequests, transfer payments from government, and appreciation in the
value of property rights. At death he has accumulated a certain amount of wealth.
If the individual's transfers of wealth and his consumption of wealth between birth
and death are added to this amount the result is his lifetime income.
The government cannot, of course, wait until the taxpayer's death for a final
determination of tax liability, so an annual accounting and tax return filing is
required. The Haig-Simons definition also requires an annual inventory of the
market value of capital investments. The Carter Commission stopped short of
adopting this principle, however, and suggested instead an accounting for capital
gains at death or on leaving Canada.62
The Carter Commission recommended a series of fundamental revisions which
were consonant and harmonious with much of the developing tax reform literature
in the United States. The recommendations of the Commission released in 1967
and the proposals contained in Blueprints released in 1977 are strikingly similar.
This is not to suggest that Blueprints was cribbed from the Carter Commission
Report. Rather, separate and independent critical studies proceeding on similar
paths in both countries led to the same general conclusions about tax reform.
The Carter Commission's principal recommendations were as follows: 63
1. The tax base would be broadened to include income from all sources. 64 Capital gains
would be included in the base as realized upon the taxpayer's death or leaving Canada.
6 5
Estate and gift taxes would be eliminated;
6 6
2. The maximum marginal rate would be 50 percent. 6 7 There would be a zero rate
bracket, 68 and deductions for dependents would become credits;
6 9
3. Three percent of employment income up to $500 would be allowed for employment
expenses;
70
4. A moving five-year average would relieve the burdens on those with fluctuating in-
come;
7 1
5. Taxation would be applied to the family as a unit. 72 Transfers of wealth within the
family unit would not be taxable, but all transfers to other family units would be included
LegalAspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921); 3 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT supra note
2, at 39: "The comprehensive tax base has been defined as the sum of the market value of goods and
services consumed or given away in the taxation year by the tax unit, plus the annual change in the market
value of the assets held by the unit..." Thus, assume that an individual's net worth at the beginning of
the year is $100, at the end of the year is $125, and that he consumed or gave away $50. The increase in
market value of assets ($25) plus that which was consumed or given away ($50) results in a total income of
$75.
62. 3 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
63. These are summarized in I ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-49. See Bucovetsky &
Bird, Tax Reform in Canada: A Progress Report, XXV NAT'L TAX J. 15 (1972).
64. 1 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 9-10.
65. 3 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 51.
66. 1 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19.
67. Id. at 20.
68. 3 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 100.
69. Id at 178.
70. Id at 312.
71. Id. at 256.
72. 1 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.
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in the taxable base.73
6. Working wives would be entitled to a limited credit for each dependent child;
74
7. Corporate and personal income taxes would be integrated; the corporate tax would
continue to be collected for withholding purposes only;7
5
8. Tax preferences for mineral extraction would be significantly reduced; 76
9. Insurance and banking enterprises would be taxed more nearly like other businesses;
77
10. Sales and excise taxes would be eventually abolished.
78
11. Withholding tax on income would be extended to various kinds of receipts;
79
12. Tax administration would be simplified by various changes, with a proposal for a
mandatory system of advance rulings on the tax consequences of intended transactions.
80
In general the Carter Commission Report adhered faithfully to the principle of
a comprehensive tax base. It defended the elimination of various tax preferences
and special treatment of different taxpayer groups in favor of a broad base subject
to substantially lower progressive rates. The free market system would control in-
vestment and business decisions instead of tax gimmickry or the tax angle. Its
detailed analysis and voluminous supporting charts and tables provide a model for
reformers who seek the same path to tax reform. It was obviously a resource for
the U.S. Treasury in the publication of Blueprnts.
B. 1967 to the Present
The Carter Commission Report was widely distributed, intentionally so in or-
der to elicit response from a broad sector of the Canadian population. In Novem-
ber 1969 the government issued a White Paper on Tax Reform in response to the
Commission Report.8 1 The "white paper" approach is used by the Canadian gov-
ernment to test the response to executive proposals without risking parliamentary
rejection. Thus, if the government were to sponsor measures not commanding a
majority vote, this might indicate a want of confidence which would require the
government's resignation. The White Paper retreated somewhat from the Carter
Report in an effort to find a ground upon which satisfactory compromise legisla-
tion could be adopted. The Carter Report and the White Paper thus provided
positions on which a vigorous national debate was focused. The parliamentary
response was the Income Tax Act of 1971.112 This legislation did not go so far as
the Carter Report, but it did begin to implement the principles of the Report
through base broadening, lower rates, and the partial integration of the individual
and corporate income tax.8 3 The subsequent developments in tax legislation in
Canada have been not unlike those in the United States in that patchwork amend-
atory legislation has tended to blur the model originally proposed in the Report.
Nevertheless, Canada did lead the way in achieving tax objectives which the
73. Id at 19.
74. 3 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 193.
75. 1 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 27.
76. Id at 26.
77. 4 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 2, at 381-438.
78. 5 ROYAL COMM'N REPORT, .upra note 2, at 3-10.
79. Id. at 131-159.
80. Id. at 136.
81. Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 62, at 18.
82. Income Tax Act, c. 63 Can. Stat. 1131 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Income Tax Act].
83. The legislation is reviewed in detail in Bucovetsky & Bird, supra note 63, at 23.
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United States has adopted more recently or is still considering. Some of these
principal achievements and their American parallels should be noted:
1. Rate reduction. The Carter Commission recommended that individual tax
rates progress no higher than 50 percent. In fact, they now progress to 43 per-
cent.84 Effective in 1982 rates in the United States will progress only to 50 per-
cent.8 5
2. Indexing. Since 1973 Canada has indexed current year rates and exemp-
tions in accordance with the average Consumer Price Index for the twelve months
ending September 30 of the previous year.8 6 Effective in 1985 the same system will
go into effect in this country.
7
3. Fringe benefits. Canada requires a closer accountability of fringe benefits by
requiring employers to place a value on such items.88 Efforts in this country to
promulgate regulations requiring such accountability have been deferred until De-
cember 31, 1983.89
4. Capital cost recovery. Pursuant to the Carter Report recommendations Ca-
nada provides generous capital cost allowances on the declining balance method.90
The new Accelerated Cost Recovery System in the United States under which the
cost of tangible property may be recovered over three, five, ten, or fifteen year
periods has only recently gone into effect for all post-1980 investments. 91
5. Estate andgij? tax provisons. Canada has no estate and gift tax but requires
all accounting for appreciation in asset values at death, in certain cases at the time
of gift, or on leaving Canada.92 New estate and gift tax rules in this country which
phase-in fully by 1987 will eliminate estate and gift taxes on all but a few estates.93
Assets passing to estate beneficiaries are entitled to a step up in basis to death time
value, irrespective of any estate tax liability. 94
6. Integration of corporate and personal income taxes. Canada recognizes the ele-
ment of a double tax on corporate dividends at both the corporate and shareholder
level. Generally, individual recipients of dividends include 150 percent of the divi-
dend in income and claim a credit against their tax of 75 percent of the "grossed
84. 1971 Income Tax Act, supra note 82, 1 117, as amended by c. 10 Can. Stat. 348 (1977) (adding
subsection 5.1); See also [1978] 3 CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH) 12,030.
85. ERTA, supra note 42.
86. 1971 Income Tax Act, supra note 82, 1 117.1(1)(f), as amended by c. 4 Can. Stat. 96 (1977); See
also [1979] 3 CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH), 12,046.
87. ERTA, supra note 42, 104(a) (amending I.R.C. § 1).
88. 1971 Income Tax Act, supra note 82, § 6(l)(a), as amended by c. 48 Can. Stat. 1275 (1981); See
[1981] 6 CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH) 35,504. See also INTERPRETATION BULL. no. 1T-71R, reprinted n
[1981] 5 CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH) 52,078; INTERPRETATION BULL. No. IT-470, reprtnted in [1981] 5
CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH) 52,475.
89. ERTA, supra note 42, § 801.
90. 1971 Income Tax Act, supra note 82, § 20(I)(a); INCOME TAX REGULATIONS 1100-06, reprinted in
[1981] 6 CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH) $ 37,132-213.
91. ERTA, supra note 42, § 201 (adding I.R.C. § 168).
92. 1971 Income Tax Act, supra note 82, §§ 48, 70. See Bird, Canada's Vanishing Death Taxes, 16 Os-
GOODE HALL L.J. 133 (1978); Carter, Federal Abandonment of the Estate Tax: The Intergovernmental Fiscal Dimen-
sion, 21 CANADIAN TAX J. 239 (1973).
93. ERTA, supra note 42, §§ 401-03 (amending I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2010).
94. I.R.C. § 1014.
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up" amount.9 5 Although there has been suggestion in the United States of such a
system, no such measure has been adopted.96 Only an exclusion of a minimum




What may be concluded from the history of tax reform in the two countries?
The literature in the United States assumes as a starting point some kind of com-
prehensive tax base, although to be sure, the writers are not in agreement as to the
precise formulation of the definition of such a base. 98 Any effort to move in the
direction of a comprehensive base must, however, deal with practical realities. In
a complex economic order ingenious advisers will continue to devise ways to avoid
the full impact of the tax bite, to which there is a legislative response. New laws,
new regulations and rulings, and court decisions further complicate the process. 99
The lofty ideals in the charge to the Carter Commission or in the introduction to
Blueprints speak to equity, fairness, simplicity, ease of compliance and administra-
tion, and promotion of economic growth and stability. Yet these ideals, so effica-
cious and worthy, inevitably come into collision with the politics of a
representative democracy. It has been said that for special interest groups the plea
is always "don't tax him and don't tax me, but tax that man behind that tree."
Surely, special interest groups work as hard for their causes in Canada as they
do here; yet the Canadians did organize a Carter Commission, publish a White
Paper, and conduct a thorough national debate on tax reform, out of which legis-
lative progress was accomplished. 100
Could not the same be done here? And, as part of the same endeavor, could
not other forms of taxation be considered, either as supplements to or as substitutes
for the income tax? 10 The value-added tax has been used with some success in
95. 1971 Income Tax Act, supra note 82, §§ 82(1), as amended by c. I Can. Stat. 58 (1977), 121, as
amended by c. 1 Can. Stat. 107 (1977). Se [1978] 2 CANADIAN TAX REP. (CCH) 7025; [1978] 3 CANADIANTAX REP. (CCH) 12,491.
96. The integration of corporate and personal income tax has been recommended in the U.S, but not
adopted. See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 30, at 68; McClure, Integration of the Personal and Corporate Income Taxes:
The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975); Special Committee on
Simplification, Section of Taxation, American Bar Association, Evaluation of the Proposed Model Comprehensive
Income Tax, 32 TAX LAW 563, 598 (1979).
97. I.R.C. § 116.
98. See generallv, B. BIrrTKER, C. GALVIN, R. MUSGRAVE & J. PECHMAN, A COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAX BASE (1968); G. BREAK &J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM (1975); J. PECHMAN, COMPREHEN-
SIVE INCOME TAXATION (1977); S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); C. GALVIN & B. BITT-
KER, THE INCOME TAX: How PROGRESSIVE SHOULD IT BE? (1976); Peel, An Approach to Income Tax
Simplifcation, 1 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 1 (1978).
99. Bittker, Reflections on Tax Reform, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 185 (1978).
100. But see BUCOVETSY & BIRD, supra note 63, at 39.
The fact that Canada has ended up with a reformed tax system which in some key respects looks
more like the present U.S. system than it does the pattern set forth in the Royal Commission Report
should give pause to reform-mongers everywhere. Instead of U.S. tax policymakers looking to the true
North for well-argued logical inspiration, as many prominent American public finance scholars sug-
gested in the post-Carter heyday, Canadian policymakers appear to have ended up looking South for
politically acceptable compromises.
101. A recent study on tax burdens demonstrates that the "overall effective rate of federal, state and
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Europe; it could provide needed revenues to finance the U.S. defense effort or to
restore solvency to the social security system. 10 2 Such questions and many others
bespeak the importance of a long range study under bipartisan auspices. Should
such an undertaking be contemplated, the Canadian experience can provide useful
insights as to the appropriate organization and the ongoing conduct of the inquiry.
local taxes in 1966 averaged nearly the same across most of the range of family incomes." Manvel, Another
Look at Comparative Tax Burdens, XII TAX NOTES 478 (1981). Interestingly, total tax revenues as a percent-
age of gross national product were almost identical for Canada and the United States in 1979 (31.2 percent
and 31.3 percent respectively). Perry FicalFigures, 29 CANADIAN TAX J. 99, 101 (1981).
102. Galvin, The Value-Added Tax-A Proposalfor the 80's, 7 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 505 (1980); The Value
Added Tax-A Symposium 6 J. CORP. LAW 5 (1980).
The economic, accounting and legal literature is replete with articles on the value-added tax. One of
the best analyses with references to many of the extant sources is A.B.A. SECTION OF TAXATION, REPORT
OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (1977), a collection of five committee essays. See
Report of the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on General Income Tax Problems of the Value-Added Tax, 24 TAX
LAW 419 (1971); Subcommittee of the Special Committee on Value-Added Tax' (Should the United States
Adopt the Value-Added Tax?-A Survey of the Policy Considerations and the Data Base,) 26 TAX LAW
45 (1972); Special Committee on the Value-Added Tax of the Tax Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion, Technical Problems in Designing a Broad-Based Value-Added Tax for the United States, 28 TAX LAW 193
(1975); Special Committee on the Value-Added Tax of the Section of Taxation, The Choice Between Value-
Added and Sales Taxation at Federal and State Levels in the United States, 29 TAX LAW 457 (1976); Special
Committee on the Value-Added Tax of the Section of Taxation, Evaluation of an Additive-Method Value-Added
Tax in the United States, 30 TAX LAW 565 (1977). See also J. DUE, SALES TAXATION (1957); D. SMITH, J.
WEBBER & C. CERF, WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (1973); Cohen, Foreign
Experience with the Value-Added Tax, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 399 (1971); Smith, Value-Added Tax. The Case For 48
HARV. BUS. REV. 77 (Nov.-Dec. 1970); Surrey, A Value-Added Tax/or the United States-A Negative View, 21
TAX EXEC. 151 (1968).
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